The GAO study evaluated the Container Security Initiative, a program allowing U.S. Customs and Border Protection staff to inspect high-risk containers at foreign seaports before they are loaded on U.S.-bound vessels.

The program was designed in the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks to address the possible threat of terrorists shipping biological, chemical and nuclear weapons to the United States.

The program aims to target all shipments from CSI ports to the United States. However, 1-in-3 potentially dangerous containers still enters U.S. seaports unscreened, the GAO said. The report blamed diplomatic considerations -- host countries have to agree to the inspections -- and "staffing imbalances" for the shortcomings.

"The staffing model's reliance on placing staff at CSI ports rather than considering whether some of the targeting functions could be performed in the United States limits the program's operational efficiency and effectiveness," the report said.

In 2004 more than 9 million cargo shipments arrived in the United States -- some 25,000 containers a day. So far, 34 governments and ports from Halifax, Canada, to Hong Kong have agreed to take part in the CSI program, and 11 more are scheduled to join by the end of fiscal year 2005.

Because the cargo supply chain often involves second- and third-party assembly, "the movement of oceangoing cargo in containers is vulnerable to some form of terrorist action," the report said.

The program, which started in January 2002, allows CPB staff to use intelligence and risk-assessment strategies to identify possibly dangerous containers. The host governments then determine whether to X-ray containers and open them if necessary, the report said.

While the majority of containers referred to the host governments are inspected, 28 percent of the containers marked "potentially dangerous" by CPB staff left foreign ports unscreened, generally because the host governments identified the containers as not dangerous.

But even if containers are inspected, there is a chance that harmful material might slip through, the report said. Now, because of varying equipment standards in the different host countries, the program gives "limited assurance that inspections conducted under CSI are effective at detecting and identifying terrorist WMD in containers."

Thus, CPB needs to implement clear standards when it comes to the efficiency of non-intrusive screening equipment (such as X-ray machines) used at participating foreign seaports, the report concluded.

"While we recognize that establishing such requirements may be a difficult issue to address," the study found, "it is important that CBP establish them because the CSI inspection may be the only inspection of some containers before they enter the interior of the United States."

The study also lists improvements, however. The CPB has improved communication between U.S. and foreign customs staff, and international awareness of the importance of global maritime transportation security has increased because of the program, the study said.

David Heyman, homeland security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington-based public policy think tank, said Tuesday in a telephone interview that the study "is about right with its criticism."

Heyman agreed that there was a strong need for uniform inspection standards and he suggested that new methods of cargo screening should be considered. One such new method is being tested in Hong Kong, Heyman said, where electronic photographs of container contents are stored in a database and digitally screened for potentially harmful materials.

"This would allow for additional analysis before the ship actually reaches a U.S. port," Heyman said.

"The current conceptual framework is very weak," said Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington. He said 5 percent of containers are screened with highly sophisticated technologies. "We need more staff and more machines to increase those numbers to 10 percent," he said.

But the CPB is not the only party to blame, O'Hanlon said. "We need more cooperation from international shippers and governments."

The GAO referred its suggestions to improve the program to the Department of Homeland Security, which has generally agreed with the office's recommendations and has "cited corrective actions it either has taken or planned to take," the report said.

There is a need to constantly improve container screening, Heyman said. "The chance of a nuclear device being smuggled into a container is unlikely, but the consequences would be catastrophic."

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