A lot of unforeseen events and developments happened after the release of QDR 2001, which was published only a few weeks after Sept. 11, 2001, which I happened to experience live in Washington, D.C. For me, it was quite obvious that this murderous attack would change world politics for a long time.

A lot of the "lessons learned" from the period between September 2001 and early 2006 found their way into the hearts and minds of those who put together QDR 2006 -- after the political experience with "willing" and "unwilling" partners, with the "war on terrorism", the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the conflict in and around Israel, the damage control after the hurricanes Katrina and Wilma and the emergence of new world powers -- China and India -- on the horizon.

The world is in transition from the years of a unipolar world dominated by the lone superpower, the United States, to a world that will be more multipolar, with power centers emerging in Beijing and New Delhi.

For a foreigner, the attitude of the U.S. government is somewhat surprising. It is very pragmatic and characterized by Realpolitik -- especially towards China. On the one hand, China is described as the only "conventional and traditional threat" for the United States, and on the other hand the United States reaches out to China as a partner for trade as well as for financial and economic cooperation.

Reading the survey it becomes obvious that the United States accepts that China is on its way to becoming a world power, but it keeps the powder dry when looking to Taiwan.

To contain China and its influence and power in Asia and beyond, the U.S. government -- especially Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice -- has shifted the emphasis of U.S. foreign and security policy to Asia. The crowning of this multi-pronged effort was the recently agreed nuclear deal between India and the United States.

QDR 2006 names other countries in Asia that the U.S. government regards as significant allies and partners, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines, that China might perceive as a kind of encirclement.

This is a prudent way for the United States to keep its status of being an Asia-Pacific power against the wishes of China to minimize or even neutralize the U.S. status quo in the region.

It will be interesting to follow this political competition in the future. I think both governments know that war between them is not a favorable option.

QDR 2006 makes it quite clear that Europe is at the level of third priority, behind Asia and the Broader Middle East.

Being "NATO-minded," and with some years of experience working in NATO headquarters, I was pleased to read about the significance of NATO as a provider of security and stability: "NATO remains the cornerstone of transatlantic security and makes manifest the strategic solidarity of democratic states in Europe and North America." NATO is as strong and efficient as NATO nations want. In the past, some European observers had the feeling that the U.S. government regarded NATO as a "tool box" from which the U.S. could pick and choose the tools it needed.

One question mark that I place is behind the statement that the United States prefers "dynamic alliances" instead of "static alliances." Is NATO "static" or "dynamic?" The answer depends on the resolve of the 26 NATO nations to make NATO strong and efficient. As "primus inter pares," the United States has to play a leading dynamic role within NATO. This starts by making NATO the political forum where worldwide security and stability issues are discussed in order to prevent the outbreak of conflicts.

NATO is more a political alliance than a military one. NATO has to orchestrate elements of soft and hard power. In close cooperation with about 20 partners of the Partnership for Peace Program, NATO at 26 should be a respected global player.

I understand that the United States wants to avoid lengthy discussions with European partners whose rhetoric is much stronger than their military capabilities.

It was interesting to listen to German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the conference in Munich in February 2006 where her message was loud and clear: NATO first!

NATO faces three challenges: Afghanistan, Iraq and the NATO Response Force or NRF. These litmus tests will decide about the future of NATO. QDR 2006 applauds NATO's role in Afghanistan, which will gain even more importance this year. NATO needs a long haul to stabilize Afghanistan beyond Kabul. NATO nations have accepted the call to strengthen their troops. I hope that they will deliver what they promised.

Iraq is a very difficult problem for NATO. Nineteen out of 26 NATO nations were or are part of the "Coalition of the Willing." Nations that opposed the war are not willing to have NATO involved as an alliance on the ground. This is difficult to change. At the very least, NATO should and could as an alliance do even more to advance nation building in Iraq and the training of Iraqi civil agents, police force and military outside Iraq.

QDR 2006 shows trust and confidence in the development of the NATO Response Force that will be operational in January 2007. Exercises with the NRF show the progress in nations' contributions as far as quality and equipment are concerned.

QDR 2006 addresses an important issue for any coalition or alliance: Interoperability. The United States is obviously prepared to enhance the technological support of partners and allies to enable synergetic affects on the ground.

Due to QDR 2006, the crystal ball offers no clear picture of the future -- neither political nor military aspects. The catchwords are change, transition, uncertainty and surprise. The planning horizon until 2025 has been labeled: "Expect the unexpected." In his statement, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld calls QDR 2006 "A roadmap for change, leading to victory."

Future permanent change and uncertainties are not what strategic planners like, but that's a fact of life. Since the end of the Cold War, world development has become unpredictable. There is only one certainty: The war on terror will be a "long war." The same is true of the duration of military commitments in peacekeeping operations around the globe.

The experiences of the last four to five years have made it clear that national and international cooperation has to be enhanced. Intra-agency, inter-agency and international rivalries and incompetence must be overcome to better cope with manmade and/or natural disasters. These lessons have led to a myriad of coordinating offices that I doubt will work together efficiently.

Dieter Farwick is Global Editor-in-Chief of the Munich-based World Security Network. This article is reprinted by permission of WSN. United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.

Community
Email This Article
Comment On This Article

Related Links
- The Long War - Doctrine and Application

Memory Foam Mattress Review

SPACE MEDIA NETWORK PROMOTIONS Solar Energy Solutions Tempur-Pedic Mattress Comparison ... Newsletters :: SpaceDaily :: SpaceWar :: TerraDaily :: Energy Daily XML Feeds :: Space News :: Earth News :: War News :: Solar Energy News