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Effects-Based Airpower And Space Power
USAF, Chief, Professional Journals for Air and Space Power Washington DC (AFNS) May 22, 2006 The term effects-based operations (EBO) entered the military lexicon during the Gulf War of 1991 and has propagated widely since then. Initially some Air Force members used EBO to help explain that war's dramatically successful outcome. Many EBO pioneers were Air Force members, but the concept has now spread to other US military services and even the militaries of other nations. This dispersion hints at EBO's potentially profound influence, yet its definitions vary, and its theoretical concepts remain hard to explain and apply. Not a template for action, EBO is instead a mind-set focused on exploiting cause-and-effect relationships. It requires disciplined analysis to plan and elicit effects that contribute to strategic goals as well as constant communication and assessment to track progress towards producing those effects. EBO has a commonsense quality, but efforts to explain it have spawned an array of related terms such as first-order effects and causal linkages. Even a basic term like effect can resist precise definition. Effects-based terminology is popular yet sometimes misapplied to legitimize new operational concepts. Merely insinuating effects-based jargon into a briefing does not make something effects based. The term effects-based operations itself has proliferated to include effects-based planning, effects-based assessment, and so forth. Indeed, EBO rivals transformation, a very fashionable buzzword in military circles. Is EBO an important concept or a passing fad? Only time will tell, but one way to gauge its potential involves viewing it through the lens of another influential concept, the revolution in military affairs (RMA). Andrew Marshall, longtime director of the Office of Net Assessment, defined an RMA as "a major change in the nature of warfare brought about by the innovative application of new technologies which, combined with dramatic changes in military doctrine and operational and organizational concepts, fundamentally alters the character and conduct of military operations" ("Revolution in Military Affairs," Center for Media and Democracy,). Key elements of that definition include new technologies applied to warfare, doctrinal change, and organizational change. Armored warfare is a classic example of an RMA. Internal-combustion-engine technology applied to armored vehicles yielded the tank. Thinkers and practitioners such as Gen Heinz Guderian of Germany developed a new doctrine of massing tanks and aircraft at critical points to break through enemy lines and disrupt rear areas. A new organization known as the panzer division implemented that doctrine. When World War II began, many countries had tanks, but German doctrine and organization made the blitzkrieg seem invincible. An RMA's doctrinal and organizational changes translate technology into military power. When one views current EBO efforts in RMA terms, several points emerge. First, the data-intensive nature of EBO demands powerful sensor, communication, and computer networks to help us understand changing battlespace conditions and produce desired effects. The US military is attempting to apply such technologies in effects-based ways, but incomplete understanding of EBO remains an obstacle. Second, to exploit these technologies within an effects-based framework, we are developing the appropriate doctrine�an embryonic process that nevertheless shows promise. Third (and toughest), if the RMA concept offers valid insight into EBO, then tapping its potential may require organizational changes as yet unclear. Since the Air Force already finds itself embroiled in reorganization driven by the Quadrennial Defense Review, Base Realignment and Closure Commission, concept of the air and space expeditionary force, and so forth, any EBO-driven alteration would occur against a turbulent backdrop. Finally and most importantly, EBO is more concerned with old-fashioned strategic thinking about achieving goals than with advanced technology or slick terminology, the former inherent in both EBO and the RMA but incapable of solving military problems by itself. Clearly, EBO strongly influences how today's Air Force conceptualizes military operations. The concept holds great promise, but we need to ponder carefully how to exploit whatever advantages it offers. Air and Space Power Journal dedicates this issue to advancing the professional dialogue about EBO. The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University For a detailed overview of this topic please visit Air and Space Power - Spring 2006, Volume XX, No. 1 Community Email This Article Comment On This Article Related Links Subscribe to SinoDaily Express - your China News Source Military Space News at SpaceWar.com
Russian Military To Withdraw From Baikonur Space Centre
Moscow (AFP) May 04, 2006Russian military personnel will withdraw next year from the space centre at Baikonur in Kazkahstan, which was set up in the 1950s when the republic was still part of the Soviet Union, the Russian space agency said Wednesday. |
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