Since Sudan was decolonized in 1956 the country has hardly experienced a single year without conflict. Civil war has raged between non-Arab Christians and animists in the south and Arab-Muslims in the north, claiming more than two million lives; famine and disease have killed another 4 million.

More recently, ethnic violence in the country's western and northern Darfur regions has, to date, claimed approximately anywhere between 70,000 lives, according to the World Health Organizationand, and 400,000, according to non-governmental organizations. Another one and a half to two million people have been displaced, with entire villages wiped off the map, creating a humanitarian crisis of colossal proportions.

Human rights groups, the U.S. Congress and former U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell have stated that genocide is taking place in Darfur.

A United Nations Security Council commission report, however, has refrained from following suit, given that if it does accept that genocide is occurring, it would be legally bound to take appropriate action. It called the violence "crimes against humanity."

As past experiences have demonstrated -- the Rwanda genocide for example -- heavy bureaucracy and conflicting political interests have traditionally slowed the U.N.'s decision-making process. While the U.N. may claim limited successes in its peacekeeping operations (Haiti), it has grossly failed in others (Rwanda).

Accordingly, the creation of a special rapid intervention force established by the former colonial power, or powers, and possibly with the participation of the United States and of a regional force, would prove to be far more efficient in addressing conflicts and preventing them from spreading. One clear advantage to this approach is that the decision-making process would be speeded up, allowing for quicker intervention. The result would be less loss of life and property. Great Britain's military intervention in Sierra Leone and France's in the Ivory Coast may be cited as successful precedents.

Despite its intensity, the violence in Darfur has generally failed to attract the world's attention, resulting in delayed intervention by mediators and humanitarians, which have met with little success and much opposition. Humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts have been hampered by bureaucratic red tape, purposely delaying peacekeeping and life-saving missions intended to relieve the suffering of the people of Darfur.

Ethnic-based conflicts such as the one unfolding in Darfur are not unusual in post-colonial Africa, where decolonization and independence was aggressively sought, often with little regard given to whether the country was politically mature and prepared for self-governance. In most cases the level of social, economic and political readiness was ignored. In a number of instances the newly founded countries were governed by military officers who possessed no prior experience in governance.

The new leaders were found to lack the ability to manage the country's natural resources, balance its economy and juggle its politics, further complicated by ethnic divisions and tribal mistrust dating back decades, if not centuries.

From the early 1950s to the late 1960s a large number of colonies sought, and at times fought, for their independence. As independence fever spread across the continent, self-rule became desirable at all costs. The results were bloody wars, commonly followed by even bloodier civil wars.

The spark that ignited those wars was frequently ethnic division. As outside mediators intervened, long-term solutions were overlooked in favor of quicker resolutions, albeit temporary ones. The result was that the problem never really disappeared and the antagonists readied for the next round of violence rather than concentrating on nation building.

The level of social, political and economic standards of living constantly regressed as resources were diverted towards military ends, much to the detriment of social construction, development and education. Sudan is a prime example. The result was a breakdown of the social, economic and political structures, or a failure of the system. This lead to the coining of the term "failed state."

Before detailing the makings of a failed state it is helpful to outline what constitutes a "strong state." In a report written for the CIA's National Intelligence Council's 2020 Project, Robert Rotberg submitted a paper titled "Nation-State Failures: A Recurring Problem," in which he defines "strong" and "failed states" in great detail.

Rotberg points that strong states deliver the goods, among which are: security, law, health care, education, an infrastructure and a working economy, including banking regulations. Rotberg states: "A failed state is a hollow polity that is no longer willing or able to perform the fundamental tasks of a nation-state in the modern world. Its institutions are flawed." He adds that in a failed state, "democratic debate is absent," and the central government is "unable to establish an atmosphere of security throughout the nation."

To be sure, colonialism came with its share of ills. Yet the colonial powers, for the most part, provided security, a judicial system and other basic necessities as outlined by Rotberg's definition of a strong state. The systemic change that occurred when colonies transitioned from dependency to independence created conflict, as change often does. In some countries it took years for the conflict to percolate before erupting, but most former colonies suffered from that same predicament.

As examples one may cite the civil wars that erupted in Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Chad, Central African Republic, Congo (Kinshasa and Brazzaville), Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe.

African countries were not the only ones affected by post-colonial disorder emanating from ethno-political divisions which led to civil strife and/or partition. The following fall under that latter category: Cambodia, Cyprus, India/Pakistan, Laos, Lebanon, Palestine/Israel and Vietnam.

As Daniel Byman, senior fellow at Brookings Institute's Saban Center, notes in his recount of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, "... the British withdrawal led to immediate conflict." Indeed, post-colonial successes (Malta, Singapore) are by far the exception, rather than the rule.

This sobering reality raises the following questions: What action can be taken to overcome the lethargic attitude and avoid repetition of violent conflict breaking out in the developing world, particularly Africa? To what extent do former colonial powers bear responsibility for the state of affairs their former domains find themselves in? And, are the former colonial powers at fault for creating artificial borders, and in the process "bundling" multiple ethnicities as a single nationality, an experiment that rarely, if ever, has worked?

France and Great Britain, for example, divvied up the spoils of the Ottoman Empire, haphazardly creating international boundaries where none previously existed. The 1916 Anglo-French agreement negotiated by Sykes-Picot at the close of World War I, when the two men proceeded to redraw the Middle East's borders by drawing straight lines in the sand, is a prime example. Much of the Middle East's troubles today arise from leftover political failures of colonialism's miscalculations.

Regretfully, the United States is going down that same path in Iraq.

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